

CUPA JOURNAL

Vol. 7, No. 3

FEBRUARY - APRIL, 1956



Scene on Campus, Cornell University

A PUBLICATION OF THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION

CUPA JOURNAL

A Publication of the
College and University Personnel Association

809 South Wright Street

Champaign, Illinois

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CUPA JOURNAL is published five times each year by the College and University
Personnel Association. Editorial offices and office of publication: 1205 West California
Street, Urbana, Illinois. Subscription rates: Free to members of the Association; \$1.00
per year for libraries.

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American Association of
Industrial Editors

FROM THE EDITOR'S CORNER . . .

At the meeting of the Executive Committee in February in Chicago, the name of CUPA NEWS was changed to CUPA JOURNAL. With the December-January issue, (Volume 7, No. 2) CUPA NEWS ended seven years of publication under the editorships of Max Sappenfield, L. E. Glander, and Frank Ives. We hope that CUPA JOURNAL beginning with Volume 7, No. 3, will have as long and as successful a career of service to the Association as has CUPA NEWS.

At the Chicago meeting the Executive Committee also reviewed the preliminary plans for the Tenth Annual Meeting at Cornell University, August 5-8. They sound most worthwhile, interesting, and sociable. A review of the records show the following persons could qualify as "tenth-yearers" if they attend the Cornell meeting:

Donald E. Dickason
James N. Ewart
L. H. Glander
Kathryn G. Hansen
Arlyn C. Marks
Max Sappenfield
Edgar P. Swanson

and the following member institutions have been represented at the previous nine Conferences:

California Institute of Technology
Indiana University
Iowa State College
Michigan State University
University of Illinois
University of Pennsylvania
State University of Iowa

If there are any omissions, or corrections, please let us know.

Please keep your comments coming regarding your publication. It is yours, you know, and it's just the Editor's job to keep it coming your way, with the type of content you want to read. Sorry space did not permit our usual "News, Notes, and Quotes" in this issue.

EMOTIONAL MATURITY — A MUST FOR GOOD LABOR RELATIONS

Frank T. deVyver

Every supervisor knows how often situations, which must be handled with good judgment, arise in working with people on the job. Here are some pointers on how to deal with the various personalities of workers under your supervision and yet maintain human dignity and respect for authority at the same time.

A few weeks ago at our house we had a visitor—a young lady of ten. When it came time to take the long automobile ride home, she insisted that a shaggy mongrel the neighbors were trying to dispose of should go along in the car. Fortunately more mature heads prevailed, but not until after a stormy period during which the young lady displayed many of the traits of emotional immaturity usually associated with one of her years.

Sometimes in considering various labor-relations cases that come to foremen, one is reminded that emotional immaturity is not confined to young ladies of ten. Too often both the worker and the foreman display the same lack of maturity as my ten-year-old relative. Becky demanded the impossible. She couldn't take the dog home with four adults and herself in the car. Yet reason was to no avail. Have you ever had a worker like that in your department?

A few days ago the union brought in a grievance demanding that a certain lady be allowed to share the work with the other spare hands, although she had never bid on a spare job. She wanted us to create an extra spare job for her, because she wanted to work on the first shift. The fact that under the contract provisions she did not have enough seniority

to stay on the first shift made no difference to her. She was asking the impossible just as Becky was. A foreman sees similar examples every day.

Each one of us in a supervisory capacity has to watch that he does not also display Becky's emotional immaturity in various ways. Perhaps we don't ask the impossible of the men and women working for us. Too many supervisors, however, find, like Barbara, that they cannot gracefully accept the inevitable.

How Do You React to Restrictions?

Today in industry we all have to follow certain rules laid down by the federal and state governments. Perhaps we don't like the protection given to unions by the Taft-Hartley law and its predecessor, the National Labor Relations Act.

Dr. deVyver received his A.B. and M.A. at Oberlin College, and another M.A. and a Ph.D. at Princeton University. He has been an Instructor in Economics at Princeton University, and is now Chairman of the Department of Economics at Duke University. He was formerly Vice President and Director of Personnel Relations, Erwin Mills, Inc., Durham, North Carolina.



Perhaps we think present-day wage-stabilization procedures are simply a lot of red tape designed to keep us from giving raises to well-deserving workers. Or perhaps we don't like the restriction of the wage-and-hour laws making it impossible to work certain groups of people overtime without paying them time and one-half for those overtime hours. Most foremen, too, work under certain company policies and restrictions. Perhaps these are also burdensome and irritating.

The emotional maturity of a foreman can often be judged by his reactions to restrictions like these. Does he get mad and pout, or does he refuse to accept the restrictions and try to get around them? Each year the Wage and Hour Division finds thousands of violations. Some of those, to be sure, arise through ignorance, but many are cases where foremen have tried to find ways around the inevitable they refuse to accept.

What Good Is Name Calling?

Becky still wanted to take the dog the next morning, after we all thought she had accepted the parental will. "You're the meanest mother in the world," she said. Here she displayed another sign of emotional immaturity so often found among both workers and foremen. When we personalize and call names we can hardly be considered better than children. It's part of my job to read a number of papers published by labor unions. Some of them are excellent but others are filled with name-calling.

Foremen must check their own maturity, too, on this score. How often I have heard a foreman say, "If it were not for that so-and-so X in my department, I wouldn't

have any complaints." In an organized plant the union is likely to get the blame if everything does not run smoothly. In an unorganized plant there is also a scapegoat if something goes wrong. Every foreman knows he should look at what he himself has done rather than blame others, but it's so easy to personalize.

Slamming Doors Won't Help.

Something went wrong so Becky started slamming doors. How childish! Yes, but also how like many of us who supervise others! No day goes by in the life of any foreman when he doesn't feel like slamming doors. The test of his emotional maturity is whether he actually does so. The other day one of our supervisors was invited to step outside to fight when he corrected a worker. I am sure it was a temptation for the foreman. The foreman, however, kept control of himself, declined the opportunity, and didn't even raise his voice.

Of course, this is what most foremen would have done, particularly if the worker were larger and stronger. Yet loss of temper and "door slamming" often show up in less obvious ways than fist fights. Every foreman knows the irritations that some workers seem to be able to think up. The test of the foreman is his reaction. If he fires the man while he is angry, he is door slamming. If, restricted by company rules on discharge, the foreman wants to get even, he is acting just like the little girl. The emotionally mature supervisor will take only considered action and certainly will not spend his time thinking up ways of getting even, no matter how aggravating the worker may be.

We had to save face for Becky. She is only a child, we said, so

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when the storm had blown over we served her her supper as though nothing had happened, and no one even mentioned the dog. She is not yet emotionally mature, so we did not expect her to admit she was wrong. How often the boss has to treat the erring supervisor the same way! We all lose our tempers. We all make mistakes if we do anything at all. But many a labor case has gone to arbitration in organized mills simply to save the face of a supervisor who made a mistake and would not admit it.

It doesn't help matters to say the union does the same thing. Lots of workers are not emotionally mature either, and they too can't admit they are wrong. A supervisor, however, should be able to rise above such pettiness and admit that once in a while he might be wrong.

Don't Misuse Authority.

In contrast to Becky's actions, consider those of her parents who acted like adults. There was no doubt they had authority over her. There was no doubt they could have used force, could have demanded an apology before dinner, and could have nagged Becky about her childish behavior. They did none of these things, although at times, I am sure, the temptation was great. The child's parents acted like emotionally mature adults, recognizing childishness when they saw it.

In his book on *The Mature Mind*, Overstreet in telling what we can do to help ourselves mentions the use of authority as an example. Speaking of teachers he says, "Again, every teacher is in a position of authority. Between him

and his students there is a gap. Will he so love to exercise his authority that he increases the gap, making his students feel small and frightened? Or will he consider the gap as merely functional in the teaching situation and treat all of his young charges as though they were equal with himself in dignity and human rights?" Becky's parents merely considered the gap as functional. They acted mature. The foreman can show his maturity the same way.

When a foreman has to use only the dignity of his office to command respect, he really does not have the true respect of his workers. When anyone tries to separate foremen and workers into two different groups of individuals and forbid association on any informal plane, he is, of course, playing right into the hands of those who preach class differences and hatreds. But he is also teaching foremen to misuse authority. The supervisor who is emotionally mature will treat his workers as equals in "dignity and human rights."

I am sure Becky's blood pressure rose during her outburst. I am sure also that the child was unhappy for a time. These are always the results of emotional immaturity. As we get older our systems can't stand such strains. For our own health and for the good of our companies, we supervisors must take a lesson from Becky. The supervisor who shows maturity in dealing with the day-to-day problems that arise is not only going to be a better supervisor who will get production at lower cost, but he will also live a happier and healthier personal life.

THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DILEMMAS

Robert S. Herman

Division of Budget, State of New York

- If he's late for work in the morning, he's taking advantage of his position.
- If he gets to the office on time, he's an eager beaver.
- If the office is running smoothly, he's a dicator.
- If the office is a mess, he's a poor administrator.
- If he holds weekly staff meetings, he is in desperate need of ideas.
- If he doesn't hold staff meetings, he doesn't appreciate the value of teamwork.
- If he spends a lot of time with the boss, he's a back slapper.
- If he's never with the boss, he's on his way out.
- If he goes to conventions, he's on the gravy train.
- If he never makes a trip, he's not important.
- If he tries to do all the work himself, he doesn't trust anybody.
- If he delegates as much as possible, he's lazy.
- If he tries to get additional personnel, he's an empire builder.
- If he doesn't want more employees, he's a slave driver.
- If he has lunch in expensive restaurants, he's putting on the dog.
- If he brings his lunch to the office, he's a cheap skate.
- If he takes his briefcase home, he's trying to impress the boss.
- If he leaves the office without any homework, he has a sinecure.
- If he's friendly with the office personnel, he's a politician.
- If he keeps to himself, he's a snob.
- If he makes decisions quickly, he's arbitrary.
- If he doesn't have an immediate answer, he can't make up his mind.
- If he works on a day-to-day basis, he lacks foresight.
- If he has long-range plans, he's a daydreamer.
- If his name appears in the newspapers, he's a publicity hound.
- If no one has ever heard of him, he's a nonentity.
- If he requests a larger appropriation, he is against economy.
- If he doesn't ask for more money, he's a timid soul (or stark mad).
- If he tries to eliminate red tape, he has no regard for system.
- If he insists on going through channels, he's a bureaucrat.
- If he speaks the language of public administration, he's a cliché expert.
- If he doesn't use the jargon, he's illiterate.
- If he writes for the Public Administration Review, he's neglecting his work.
- If he has never written an article, he hasn't had a thought of his own in twenty years.
- If he enjoys reading this, he's facetious.
- If he doesn't think it's funny, he is entitled to his opinion.

A COMMENT ON THE "GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE"


Marten S. Estey

By common agreement, the outstanding event in labor-management relations during the past year was the so-called guaranteed annual wage settlement between the United Auto Workers and the major auto manufacturers—Ford, GM and Chrysler. Possibly no other collective bargaining issue has attracted such widespread public interest and discussion. Debate on the issue of the guaranteed annual wage, in fact, began more than two years ago, when the UAW took the unprecedented step of announcing its 1955 demands two years in advance. Yet despite the attention it has received, many of the basic facts about the guaranteed annual wage continue to be obscured by conflicting claims, misinformation and misconceptions. While many fundamental questions as to the economic consequences of the guaranteed annual wage program can be answered only after considerably more experience has been accumulated, this seems an appropriate place in which to clarify some of the main points.

What is the guaranteed annual wage? In its present form (i.e. as in the Ford-UAW contract), it is not a guaranteed annual wage at all. Employees are not guaranteed 52 weeks full pay per year, as the term might seem to imply—far from it. Instead what they are guaranteed by the contract is a supplemental unemployment benefit—SUB—which at most is available to the worker for only half of each year, and which technically speaking is not a wage payment.

Under the Ford-type plan, a worker who is laid off for reasons beyond his control, receives as unemployment benefit a specific sum of money each week, for periods up to (in some states) 26 weeks. Now supplemental unemployment benefits enter the picture. Under SUB the unemployed worker gets from the company a supplement or addition to his unemployment compensation, which, taken together with his UC benefit, is intended to bring his weekly income while unemployed up to approximately 65 per cent of his regular pay (after taxes). At no time does he get full wages while unemployed. If at the end of 26 weeks he is still unemployed, both UC and SUB payments cease (26 weeks represents the maximum period; eligi-

Dr. Marten S. Estey received his B.S. degree from Purdue University in 1940, and the Ph.D. degree from Princeton University in 1952. From 1948-1952 he was Assistant Professor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, and since 1952 he has been a Lecturer in the Department of Economics, Michigan State University. Dr. Estey is a member of the Industrial Relations Research Association and the American Arbitration Association. He is the author of "Patterns of Union Membership in the Retail Trades," in the July, 1955 issue of *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, and of "The Strategic Alliance as a Factor in Union Growth," in the October, 1955 issue of *ILR Review*.



bility for either UC or SUB may expire sooner in many cases).

Clearly, this is a more expensive program than unemployment compensation alone. Whether or not this is desirable, of course, depends upon your point of view, for the decision as to the proper relationship between unemployment benefits (including or excluding SUB) and normal pay is not one which can be reached by objective criteria alone; in the last analysis, it is a matter of judgment. It should be pointed out, however, that as far back as 1935, when the Social Security Act was passed, it was generally considered that unemployment benefits should approximate 50 per cent of normal income. It hardly seems surprising that two decades later, in a period of vigorous prosperity, there should be a strong drive for more generous provision for the unemployed than that which we felt we could afford in the midst of a major depression.

But how much of an economic burden is involved? Alarm is often expressed that the guaranteed annual wage is a financial load which few businesses can manage, or one which in bad times could prove disastrous to even the largest corporations.

Supplemental unemployment benefits, quite obviously, are less expensive than a true guaranteed annual wage, but may not even SUB impose a crushingly heavy cost? For the present, the answer appears to be a negative one. Under the Ford agreement, the cost of SUB is equivalent to a nickel per man-hour worked. While this is by no means an insignificant amount, it is certainly no more of a financial strain on a company than a regular nickel an

hour wage increase of the sort which industry has often met successfully in the past. In short, viewed strictly from the cost angle, SUB is comparable to a direct wage increase of quite normal proportions.

Another useful benchmark against which we may measure the burden to management of the combination of unemployment compensation plus SUB is the fact that under the Ford plan, total company contributions for both have been estimated to amount to something less than 3% of payroll, or less than the maximum burden originally envisaged when the unemployment compensation laws were brought into being by the Social Security Act of 1935.

But even though a company can cope with current contributions of a nickel per hour worked — or even more, as is to be expected in the future — what happens in the event of a severe or prolonged depression? How can a company meet such obligations just when it needs to economize most? The answer is that as defined in the Ford-type agreement, the company's commitment to supplement unemployment benefits is limited. During periods when few workers are unemployed, the supplementary payments accumulate in a fund. When the fund reaches the sum of \$250 million, payments cease until it falls below that point. If unemployment is widespread, and withdrawals from the fund exceed deposits into it, withdrawals continue until the fund is exhausted, and there the company's obligation ends. It is not required to put extra money into the fund — only to maintain its current contribution of a nickel per hour worked. Thus a clear and specific limit has

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been placed upon the extent of the company's financial obligation for supplementation.

In any case, if experience with private pension plans—the unions' first big venture into the field of supplementary social security—is a fair guide, it seems unlikely that SUB will be extended to all industry, big and small, regardless of financial and economic circumstances. For the private pension plans, which were initiated in the steel industry in 1949, have been extended in the intervening six years to no more than an estimated ten million workers, or less than one in every four industrial workers. Private pension plans have made relatively little headway among small businesses. This suggests that SUB will not soon be imposed on the majority of American industry.

Under the conditions we have just described, many people feel that the cost factor is not the most significant characteristic of the Ford-type agreement. They believe instead that its real impact is to be found in the acceptance by management of the principle of financial responsibility for its unemployed workers. This, they argue, constitutes a radical departure from the accepted way of handling the economics of unemployment. But the principle that employers should contribute to the support of unemployed workers is far from new, for it has been since 1935 the fundamental concept upon which the whole structure of unemployment compensation legislation rests. Thus the Ford Motor Com-

pany, thru payroll tax payments, has in the past contributed to the support of its unemployed workers; under the new agreement it will continue as the source of such support, but its contributions will be more generous, and will be administered through a dual mechanism rather than through the government alone. What is basically new in the Ford-type agreement is that through SUB the company has agreed to accept greater responsibility for the economic lot of its unemployed workers than that required of it by law.

One may question, of course, whether SUB is the most appropriate approach to the problem of unemployment compensation. If unemployment benefits are inadequate to cover the economic needs of the unemployed auto worker, it seems reasonable to assume that they are also inadequate for unemployed workers in other industries, whose employers do not provide SUB. A more equitable, and certainly more effective way of improving the lot of the unemployed worker generally would be the liberalization of unemployment compensation through legislation applicable to industrial workers as a group. In some states, of course, this has already been done (perhaps in anticipation of the SUB). Where it has not, the effect of SUB may be to stimulate such legislative action, just as the drive for private pension plans in 1949 led in 1950 to modification and liberalization of the old-age and survivors benefits of the Social Security Act.

THE GAW AND UNEMPLOYMENT

William H. Knowles

In partisan argument over the GAW, both sides have made sweeping statements as to its ability to reduce unemployment. The confusion generated is, in part, due to failure to distinguish between types of unemployment. This paper, then, proposes to examine the effect of the GAW on different types of unemployment.

Shift in Consumer Demand. If there is a shift in consumer tastes which requires a reallocation of the labor force, there is not much the individual firm can do about it. A tenet of the free enterprise system is that free consumer choice shall allocate the factors of production among alternative consumer goods and, once the GAW reserve funds are reduced, consumers remaining loyal to the product or the firm would, in effect, be paying a penalty price for those consumers who have shifted their buying pattern. On the other hand, businessmen, seeking to protect the GAW reserve fund, will have an additional incentive to make market forecasts, survey consumer desires, engage in product development, and promote effective merchandising and advertising. Opponents of the GAW answer that business already has adequate incentive to do these things; namely, survival in business and higher profits.

Technological Unemployment. Increased efficiency caused by technological change requires a reallocation of the labor force in those situations where consumer demand will not absorb the increased supply of the particular product. In a competitive market

the employer has no alternative but to keep up with technological change in order to survive. GAW payments will be helpful to those workers who must adjust to the new situation but it will not (and should not) prevent technological unemployment in competitive industries. In monopolistic industries the employer has some control over the rate at which he chooses to introduce technological change and frequently holds back to protect his investment thereby avoiding rapid obsolescence of existing equipment. Under these circumstances, the GAW would provide an incentive to adjust the rate of technological change to normal labor turnover rates or to the expansion of the market. For this reason, unions argue that the GAW will lessen the impact of automation.

Seasonal Unemployment. Some forty years ago leaders in the scientific management movement pointed out the many costs hidden in seasonal unemployment, and they pioneered in ways in which to reduce this type of unemploy-

Professor Knowles has had considerable experience in working with unions, government, and industry in industrial relations and in personnel work, spending two years in the British West Indies studying labor-management relations. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Labor Economics at Michigan State University. He is the author of "Personnel Management: A Human Relations Approach".



ment. Apparently the desire to maximize profits is not quite the powerful force economists assume it to be, for many firms have been singularly lacking in imagination on how to increase their profits by reducing seasonal swings in their business. It is argued that the GAW will not only provide an additional cost incentive to study ways of reducing seasonal unemployment, but that it will present the cost problem to employers in such a dramatic way that they cannot help but see the point. To the extent that seasonal unemployment can actually be reduced, the GAW will help.

Managerial Unemployment.

Unemployment can also result from careless, wasteful use of labor arising from bad planning, and the costs of this type of inefficiency is not always apparent. The GAW can provide a genuine incentive for employers to do something about unemployment caused by poor management which is completely within the control of the individual firm. Critics point out, however, that this argument was also used to favor merit rating (or experience rating) in unemployment insurance and unions generally condemned merit rating as unworkable. Unions now reply that merit rating failed to work in unemployment insurance because the penalty was not great enough, while the penalty under the GAW is sufficient to make management efficient.

Cyclical Unemployment. Business men are victims of the business cycles and have no control over them. Accordingly, the GAW cannot provide an incentive to businessmen to stop a depression. Unions have argued, however, that depressions are mainly caused by

lack of purchasing power and with a universal GAW, purchasing power would be guaranteed. Economists dispute the purchasing power theory of prosperity and point out that depression causation is very complex. There is no denying, however, that unemployment compensation together with supplemental GAW payments may hold off secondary unemployment by maintaining purchasing power.

The correct approach to business cycles is in monetary and fiscal policy of the government. Unions now argue that the GAW will cause conservative employers who believe in the "natural laws" of the market to join with unions in appealing to the government for effective counter cyclical policies. It is doubtful, however, if many business men need such an incentive. Depression means unemployed capital as well as unemployed labor.

Voluntary Unemployment.

Economists describe the situation in which labor prices itself out of the market by demanding too high wages, as voluntary unemployment. The GAW, which is a wage increase in the form of forced saving payable when unemployed, would prolong voluntary unemployment by increasing the withholding power of workers. Clearly, this is not a desirable situation. The difficulty, however, is in determining whether unemployment, under a given circumstance, is voluntary or involuntary.

Summary. The question then becomes: What is a reasonable incentive to make employers reduce unemployment, yet not penalize them excessively for unemployment over which they have no control?

IMPROVEMENTS IN UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS

Robben W. Fleming

Director, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations
University of Illinois

When I began to think seriously about the subject of "Improvements in Labor-Management Relations," the only thing I could think of was a story that George Taylor is very fond of telling about the Pennsylvania Dutch.

It seems that in connection with their burial ceremonies, custom requires the friends and neighbors to drop some earth on the casket and say nice things about the dear departed. In this particular case, the dear departed, unfortunately, was the town no-good. The minister was considerably worried about this because he wasn't quite sure what anyone was going to be able to say that was good. It would not be appropriate, at a graveside ceremony, to say the things that probably justifiably should have been said. So anyway, came the ceremony and the casket was being lowered and the minister in some fear and trepidation stood there waiting to see what was going to happen. Eventually, one of the neighbors stepped up and took a little earth and dropped it on the casket and said, "Well, John, you weren't always as bad as you were most of the time." I thought maybe most of you would think that labor-management relations aren't always as bad as they are most of the time.

Seriously, my first thought when I started to prepare for this occasion was to try and recall the major events in the years since the

war. I was reaching for the things that stood out in my mind as major events on the labor-management scene. I'd like to tick them off because it may refresh your minds on what's happened in this period since the war.

Let's start in 1946—that was really the year of the big strikes. We suffered the biggest man-hour loss in our nation's history, but interestingly enough many of you may not realize, not the biggest loss proportionately. In 1919, after the first World War, there was a greater loss of man-hours of production proportionately than in 1946, if you adjust to the different size of the population.

In 1947, came the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which has been a subject of controversy ever since.

1948 was the year that GM came through with the cost of living escalator tied to the long-term contract which became quite popular throughout industry.

1949 was the pension year. This was the year, you remember, of the big steel case, when the board of inquiry came up with the recommendations on pensions. After that settlement pensions became a very widespread subject of bargaining throughout industry.

1950 was the year in which GM inaugurated the productivity formula. It's easy to remember this because it was a five-year contract and 1955 is the expiration year. 1950 was also the year, you

remember, in which Korea came along and we again went into a wage stabilization period which lasted into 1952.

The thing that stands out in my mind about 1952 is the steel strike and the Supreme Court's decision on seizure, which certainly had an impact on the whole course of labor relations, and on the relationship of government to labor relations in this country.

1953 brought the beginning of serious talk about merger in the labor movement. It's a question of whether the AF of L and CIO can, in fact, merge, and if so, what the implications of this are.

1954, I think of as the period of readjustment. The most spectacular examples were in the auto industry where you had so many mergers. There were also some pretty substantial readjustments in terms of how a company and a union can live together when economic circumstances begin to put the heat on them.

Those are the things that stand out in my memory since World War II. I think you can find some areas of improvement. Let me try and list some of them for you. One that occurs to me is this—quite clearly in the last ten years you can say that on the management side the industrial relations function has emerged in company thinking as a much more important area than it ever was before. If you think back in your own experience before the war, how many companies that you know of had industrial relations or personnel directors at the vice presidential level? Not very many in my experience. I can tick off a good many personnel people who got into personnel in the early days quite accidentally. I know

a fellow who has happened to be a very good personnel manager who was put into the job because he got his lower arm cut off in a machine accident in the shop. He was a good fellow and everyone wanted to keep him around. It was thought that all a personnel man had to do was to keep track of people and pay them, and that he could do this as well as anybody else. In any event I think you'll agree that the industrial relations function now is a much more important function in general management circles than it was ten years ago.

Secondly, it seems to me that you can say that management's attitude toward collective bargaining is gradually changing to an affirmative rather than a negative one. I've always been impressed as I watched management in bargaining with how many managements have taken an essentially negative attitude and have said, "Well now, what are we going to have to give this time?" A good many companies are now deciding that they can get something out of collective bargaining, that they can approach it affirmatively rather than negatively. The classic example of this is GM in connection with the productivity formula. I'm very well aware that from the point of view of many smaller companies, productivity is an extremely difficult item, particularly if there is an attempt to tie it to the exact GM formula. But, on the other hand, GM executives are satisfied that out of the productivity formula they got something that they wanted. Part of what they wanted was a relative freedom within the plant, efficiency wise, which they would not have had otherwise. I would des-

cribe this as affirmative bargaining. The productivity formula was essentially the company's idea. They pressed for it in the bargaining, partly because they wanted a five-year contract. GM bought five years of stability with that productivity formula and it's paid off. Now, that's the kind of affirmative bargaining I mean.

Thirdly, I would say that among the new generation of industrial relations-personnel people on the management side you are finding much more of a disposition to talk about labor relations problems in an objective, analytical fashion without so much emotion attached to it. There was a time, and it was perfectly natural, when the mere mention of a labor union raised management's blood pressure. I want to cite an experience I had about a year ago when I talked to a management person who had been designated the manager of a new plant, which was in the process of being built at the time. He knew the plant was going to go into production about a year hence. About all he had at this point, were a bunch of construction people working around there. We chatted about his union situation after the plant was in production. I was very much impressed with the way he talked about this, because he could just as well have been talking about a production problem. He said, "I think I'm going to be organized at the plant. I don't think there's any doubt about it. Now from my point of view if I'm going to be organized I'd like to be organized by a union that I think I can live with. I think this is a legitimate objective as far as I'm concerned, and I'll tick off what seem to me to be the possibilities, and I'd like

your reactions to them. I've got construction workers in here now putting up my plant. Some of these fellows are going to stay because we will need maintenance men. That means that there are going to be some crafts that have got a foothold in here at the outset, because these fellows are all organized. I don't want twelve different unions to deal with in this plant. I don't want plumbers, electricians, carpenters, etc. So I'd rather not have the crafts, maybe I'll get them anyway, but I'd rather not have them. Now, let me see what my other alternatives are. There is an AF of L industrial union which wants to organize me, too. I know this. I've looked into it and I've studied that union and I think it's a pretty good one and I wouldn't object at all, as a matter of fact, if they organized us. One thing bothers me, though. I think they've got a deal with some of the construction people so that they'll work together with them and we'll end up with two or three unions, and that I don't want. I'd rather just have one overall union, so I'd rather the AF of L industrial union didn't organize me. Now, there's a CIO industrial union that's interested in organizing me, too. I've looked into that union, and I think it's a pretty solid one. As a matter of fact, I've had dealings with them elsewhere and they're good people, but there's one thing wrong with them as far as I'm concerned, and that is they want to impose on me a pattern of another industry which I don't think quite fits our industry." He went on in this fashion ticking off the various possibilities, and he ended up by saying, "I think what we're going to do is let anybody that wants to

try to organize our employees, and we'll give them completely free rein, insofar as access to the people is concerned. We're not going to try to fight them off and keep them away from the plant, but we are going to fight to present our side of the case, and to point out some of these things I've been explaining to you. Now, what do you think will happen?"

The thing that impressed me about this conversation was that here was a fellow who was going to be the plant manager and to all intents and purposes he could have been discussing with you one of his production problems. He wasn't excited because he was talking about labor unions. This was a problem that he was going to have to face, and a very real problem, and he wanted to get a union he thought he could deal with. But, he was under no illusions that he was going to be organized, and he didn't regard it as a calamity if he was. Now, I think, in general conversations I've had with management people, this is increasingly the attitude that you find.

Fourth, and in a little different direction, I would say that the Communists have now been pretty well run out of influence in the labor movement. There are still pockets and you find some places where they're troublesome, there's no question about it, but by and large the Communists have lost their influence in the labor movement.

And I would add as another improvement, the jurisdictional agreements within the unions which have been worked out, both on the AF of L side, the CIO side, and between them. These agreements aren't working one hundred

percent perfectly, but they're working an awful lot better than before when one found himself up against the completely frustrating situation of being willing to deal with the union if he just knew which one he had to deal with. I would say that substantial progress has been made in the last few years in the direction of the unions working out their internal problems.

If I were to add one final improvement before I go on to the next point, I would say that the very high degree—probably up around ninety percent—of inclusion of arbitration clauses for disputes arising under the contract has been a good development. This means that such disputes have a way of being resolved without creating undue stress and unrest.

Now, even as I list the above things, I realize that when people talk about improvements in labor-management relations the thing they are now often talking about is what's happened to strikes and what's happened to labor unrest. Do we have a greater stability now, have strikes lessened, are we getting greater production, are we having less slow-downs, interruptions, things of this kind? It's really to this area that I want to devote the major part of what I have to say.

It may surprise and even shock you if I say that I think a certain amount of industrial unrest is not only inevitable but is probably desirable. Now let me try and explain, because I think that's the sort of statement which on it's surface doesn't look very good. I have said, and I repeat, that I think a certain amount of industrial unrest is both inevitable and probably desirable. First of all,

let me point out to you that unions are not a phenomena of America, that in every industrial society in the world you will find unions of one sort or another. This indicates to me that workers have felt that from their point of view it's desirable to have an organization representing them. Secondly, in any enterprise, at least any enterprise that has a degree of freedom, you've got this age-old question of "How do you split the pie?" The worker would always like more money. The management would always like to make more profits, and the investor would like a greater return on his investment. We're very fond, in America, of saying that there is an identity of interest between labor, management, and even the investor, and if you look over the long-term it's true. Certainly if a business goes under there aren't going to be any jobs for the labor people, there aren't going to be any profits for the management people, and there isn't going to be any return for the investor. But to say this is to obscure a pretty basic conflict. You and I both know from our collective bargaining experience that where the parties are bargaining there is never one single, unalterable solution to the dispute. It doesn't work that way. You can start at the far extreme—from the company's standpoint—and there is a point where the company simply will not give in to the union, because it feels that to do so will put the company out of business. Now, no company is going to move to that point. Then, there's a point where the company will go only with great reluctance, thinking that it's bad for the company. Then there's a point where the

company will go with a little pushing, and there's a point where it would like to settle. In other words, what I'm saying to you is that we know from our practical experiences in collective bargaining that when parties bargain, there's always an area within which the settlement is going to be made. Inevitably within this area there's a great deal of room for disagreement. The union knows that there are various degrees as to how far management will go, and it's going to push for the highest degree it thinks it can get. Management, on the other hand, is going to push for the lowest degree it can get. Therefore, when we say that there is an identity of interest we are obscuring the fact that there is a very real area of dispute. If you recognize this, I would like to move on to my next point, which is that if you're going to have this area of dispute then you've got to find some way to resolve the matter. You can do this in a variety of ways. You can do it the way the Russians do it. This is to deprive management and labor of any freedom whatsoever, to have token organizations representing management, token organizations representing labor, with the government making the decision. This is the way they do it; this is their system. They don't have industrial strife in our sense, but they don't have freedom in our sense, either.

You can do it the way the Germans do it. They are now experimenting with what they call co-determination. You've probably heard of this. They have laws in the coal and steel industry, for instance, which provide that a part of the board of directors of a

company must come from the labor union and, in general, these laws provide that the personnel director, or the industrial relations director, must be a labor man. This is a way in which you can attempt to settle this conflict that I contend, and I think is obvious, is there.

You can resolve the conflict the way the English and some of the Scandinavian countries are trying to do it — by nationalization. That is, you can have the government take over. This is quite different from the kind of thing the Russians do in that there is an entirely different set of values in the western world than there is in the eastern world. But the British have tried to resolve some of these questions of conflict by nationalizing the industry, and this means that government ultimately is going to have to make a good many of the decisions. There are some very interesting things, if you follow the British experience, that are happening. Neither the trade unions nor the labor party seem to know whether they want to extend nationalization to additional industries.

In America we have said we'll try to resolve this conflict by collective bargaining. We prefer this because we think it's most consistent with our ideas of a free economy. We'll let these other methods go for the time being. But if you are going to resolve conflict by collective bargaining, then you've got to recognize the price that you're going to pay for this, and the price is that you permit the parties a considerable degree of freedom. When you permit parties a considerable degree of freedom they will not always do what you want them to do. They

will not always behave "responsibly." They may be irresponsible, they may be irrational, from your point of view, but you can't have it both ways, you see. As people — we don't always do what other people would like to have us do. We don't always behave in what other people think is a rational fashion, but we have freedom, and you can't have it both ways. You've got to pay the price of freedom which is to permit a certain amount of irresponsible conduct, to permit some inequities in collective bargaining, and to permit the lion to end up on occasion with the lion's share. I don't think we have to deceive ourselves for a minute that collective bargaining is a perfect solution, which will always result in justice being done and conflict being minimized. It doesn't work that way. All we have to say is that looking at the alternatives, we like collective bargaining better than we do the other kinds of things that people have been able to think up. Now, I would argue, therefore, that a certain amount of industrial conflict is inevitable, that within this area where collective bargaining takes place, we deceive ourselves if we say there is an identity of interest among the parties. There isn't an identity. There isn't any one scientific, unalterable way in which you reach a solution. This area of conflict isn't peculiar to America; you've got it in every industrial society of the world. Every society has had to try to decide how to resolve industrial conflict. They have done it in various ways. The Russians have done it one way; the Germans have done it another. We're trying to do it by collective bargaining. If you accept this much of my argu-

ment, you will not be disturbed that collective bargaining is less than perfect. The mind of man has not so far devised a perfect device for settling disputes of this kind, and probably never will. Conflict may be desirable because in our kind of economy there is no way to eliminate conflict without at the same time eliminating freedom. Of course, collusion between labor and management sometimes brings industrial peace. But that kind of industrial peace doesn't appeal to me as the kind of industrial peace that we want, and therefore, under a system of collective bargaining, where there is peace of that kind, I'm not impressed with it.

If you can accept my general argument, up to this point, that collective bargaining is only an imperfect device, but a device that we have worked out, and that it carries with it inevitably a certain amount of conflict, and a certain amount of unrest, then I would suggest to you that there are five general areas which from my experience give reason for some hope of improvement in collective bargaining over the next few years. I would caution that I don't regard these in any sense as cure-alls, that I feel quite confident that industrial conflict in general is going to continue, but I would say that out of my experience watching these last few years, these five general observations seem to me to offer some hope for improvement in labor-management relations.

First is this, and it's a pretty obvious one, though sometimes we don't think about it: I believe there is increasing recognition of the fact that the people in labor unions and in management groups

are essentially the same. There are good people, bad people, and indifferent people. There are people whose motives can be impugned on both sides. There are the power hungry; there are people who are interested in the greatest degree of democracy. There are people on both sides who are idealists, and who really are looking for a way to resolve human difficulties. I don't find the people in labor organizations and in management organizations very different. The cartoonists used to draw the big capitalist with the diamond stick pin and the stovepipe hat, and the labor union fellow with the long beard and the stick of dynamite under his coat. Those prototypes, if they ever existed, are long since gone. You know there have been many studies in the last year of this question of dual loyalty, and a good deal of surprise occurs when you question a worker about his loyalties to the union and to the company, you discover that he is loyal to both. In fact, the fellow who is disaffected from his union, is very often the fellow who is disaffected from the company. Don't we all know that a worker has multiple loyalties just as you management people have multiple loyalties? You don't have just a single loyalty to your company. You have loyalties to your friends, to your church, to your clubs, and so forth. In many ways these don't conflict. But because the worker has this many-sided loyalty, you must be cautious about concluding that he isn't interested in his union. This is a little like the family. When we're having a family squabble, we can argue to beat the band among ourselves, but let anybody from the

outside enter the fray and we promptly join ranks and club the outsider. Now, this is a good deal the way you will find labor union people. It's quite true, you can find any number of cases where the individual has little or no interest in attending his union meetings. You would certainly judge him not to be an active union person. And yet I've personally seen a good many times when an attack on the union in some way will cause this fellow to immediately close ranks with the union. I can only explain to you why he does this on the general ground that I think workers in this country have decided that organization, union organization, is good for them, though they don't always like the kind of organization they have.

Secondly, I would say that management people, particularly, need to recognize something that's often hard for them to recognize; namely, that labor in this country is an essentially conservative force. Let me explain what I mean by that. The noise of the conflict between labor and management often distorts the picture. If you'll look back in labor-management history in this country I don't think you'll find very many times when a union has pushed a management to the point of putting it out of business. Granted, this has happened on occasion. However, I don't think you'll find very many times that this has happened. On the contrary, you'll find a good many times when the company has had to come to the union as it did in the recent Studebaker case, and say, "Look, if we're going to continue in business we've got to have some help from you." On those occasions my reading of history is that the

union was likely to cooperate. This is basically because the individual worker sees his job going if this threat is true.

As one more bit of evidence that labor is an essentially conservative force, I point out to you that labor has taken a very strong role in throwing Communists out of unions, and you'll find no stronger feelings on the Communist issues than among the working people. And finally, I would just say to you as an observation on this point of labor's conservatism, that in this precarious world situation which we are now in, the working people of this country can make a very great contribution. If they believe in our system, their counterparts all over the world are much more likely to believe in it. And my general conclusion is that the working people of this country are committed to the free enterprise system.

My third general suggestion to you in terms of things that may improve labor-management relations, is this: I have never found a substitute for constructive intelligent leadership on the part of management. And I don't think that appeasement in labor relations pays off for a company any more than appeasement pays off on the international scene. I'd much rather see a company take "tough but fair" attitude than I would to see it try to appease. I don't think you get anywhere when you try to appease the union. Now I caution you, if you're going to be "tough but fair" you want to be pretty careful that your judgment of what's fair is a judgment that will appeal to other people as fair. That is, the mere fact that you think it's fair doesn't necessarily mean that it's going

to appeal to either the union people or the outsiders as fair. So, when you're prepared to adopt a policy of this kind, which I think is a sound policy, be pretty sure that it is, in fact, fair. As a sort of corollary to this I would urge again that management ought to look on collective bargaining as more than a negative proposition. I think it's an affirmative possibility, and I simply refer again to the GM experience which seems to me a classic example along these lines.

The fourth point is this, that despite what I claim is the essential conservatism of the labor movement, I think you're going to find in the years ahead that labor will press for an increasing consultative role. I want to talk about that for a minute, because I think it's an important one. I think the union is, on a great many problems, going to press you management people to consult it all along the line, but I don't think that when the subject reaches the point of a decision that the union wants either the power of decision or the responsibility for the decision, and I think they realize that you can't have the power of decision if you aren't willing to accept the responsibility. Now, let me try and enlarge on that point just a little bit. I've just been reading a monograph which has been written by one of our faculty people who has been on sabbatical in England for six months. While there he made a study of local labor-management relations in the Birmingham area. One of the things he talks about is this whole decision-making proposition. It interested me that this dispute has been going on in England for a hundred years. In

the middle of the 1800's the unions in England began to press management on this matter of consultation, and management has resisted, and the problem isn't resolved to this day. The challenge to management in this country is to find the way to consult without undermining its power of decision. I don't think this is impossible. I think you can maintain the power of decision and still consult. Consulting is admittedly a difficult procedure. It's frustrating, it's time consuming, it's difficult, but I'm pretty sure you're going to have to face it, and if you're going to have to face it you ought to face it in as intelligent and constructive a manner as you can.

My fifth and last point, in terms of general suggestions of ways that it seems to me collective bargaining may be improved, is this one: I am always impressed with what seems a sort of an unexplored area for use of the neutral in terms of a kind of consultative role, but not in the normal sense. Let me try and explain by example what I mean. I was always impressed as a mediator with how many times when you go into a dispute and you sit there and listen to the parties talk, you often very shortly come up with an idea for resolving it. At first I was embarrassed to toss out the idea because it was so obvious, and because I said to myself, "Well, now, these parties know much more about this dispute than I do. I'll be laughed at if I toss out this suggestion, which seems to me a very obvious one." Finally, in some cases, I'd get up nerve enough to do it. And to my surprise, it would often work. This was in no sense the result of

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genius on my part. What I said was a perfectly obvious suggestion that would occur to any outsider who had a little experience and some imagination. The only way I can explain why the same idea doesn't occur to the parties is by repeating the old adage that they're so close to the forest that they can't see the trees. I've been impressed over and over that there are times when the parties to a dispute become so involved in the minutiae of a dispute that they are unable to see a broader issue that somebody from the outside, who has no commitments either way, can see. I've seen this same thing in arbitrations. And I've often wished that I could stop being an arbitrator and attempt to settle the case. I conclude from this that there is an unexplored area for use of an outsider, and I toss out the suggestion to you that when you are wrestling with a knotty problem, and you don't know what to do about it, call in an outsider even though he may have different views than you do on a good many things. It won't do you any good to try out your ideas on somebody that you are sure will agree with you. I'm not urging that as the result of this procedure you change your mind. I would never give such a person the responsibility for making the decision, but I think you would benefit from the intellectual, but practical exercise of talking the problem over with someone who is not so close to your particular forest that he can't see the trees. Out of this you may emerge with exactly the plan you had before, and if you do, I'd say, "Good," You may alter it; you may alter it a good deal. But in any event I think you will emerge from the

process with a better, sounder proposition.

Like the Egyptian mummy, I am now pressed for time, but I would not like to stop without trying to pull together in a little bundle what I have tried to say to you. So if you'll let me recapitulate for a minute, it seems to me essentially I've said this: The very necessity in any industrial society for deciding how you're going to distribute the proceeds from any business gives rise to a certain inevitable conflict. We obscure this fact if we say the interests are identical. There is an area of conflict that you can't escape. You must find a way in every industrial society in the world to resolve the conflict. You can do it in a variety of ways. You can do it the way the Russians do it; you can do it the way the Germans do it; you can do it the way the English and Scandinavians do it, or you can do it the way we do it. If you're going to do it the way we do it, you've got to pay the price. A free economy has its price. It requires permitting people to do what they want to do, and if you do that they will not always act in a rational, responsible way. If we want to handle our industrial disputes by the collective bargaining route, then I think this leads to the conclusion that a certain amount of industrial conflict is inevitable and probably desirable, because it is the only way that is consistent with a free economy. If you accept this much, then I simply toss out to you five general propositions which seem to me to offer some hope of improvement in labor-management relations. First, that the people in labor and management are essentially the

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same. There are good people, bad people, and indifferent people, motivated by a great variety of things. Secondly, I think management particularly needs to recognize that labor is an essentially conservative force in this country, and I would urge you to think about that one pretty seriously, because I think it's important in the whole framework of what happens in the years ahead. Thirdly, I would say to you that appeasement in labor relations will fail as a policy on the part of management, and I don't think there's any substitute for intelligent, constructive leadership. I'd much rather see you pursue a "tough but fair" policy than appeasement, on the theory that you can buy stable relations. I don't think you can. And as my fourth proposition, I have said that despite what I regard as the essential conservatism of the labor movement, I think they're going to push you for an increased area of

consultation, and this I regard as one of the great challenges of the years ahead, because consultation is a difficult, frustrating kind of process. But if you're going to retain the initiative, which I think you have to maintain, then I think you're going to have to meet this challenge. And finally, I've said that I think there's an area that's unexplored for the use of the neutral expert which could be helpful to you.

My concluding observation is simply this—you may feel that I haven't really talked about improvements in labor-management relations, and in a sense I haven't. But I think my thesis really is this: You can't expect improvements in labor-management relations in this country until you understand what we have and why we have it. What I've tried to do is to explain what I think we have, why we have it, and what the price of it is.

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AUGUST 5-8, 1956

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE WHITE COLLAR WOMAN WORKER*

Helen C. Hurd

In discussing the special problems of the white collar woman worker we are faced with problems of definition. About the only word that is clear in the title is the word "woman." It is not easy to define a white collar worker. The skills they employ may range from those required of many wage earners all the way up to the high level of education and training required of the professional specialist. We may be speaking of the head of a department or the file clerk, the reception clerk or the purchasing agent, the saleslady or the buyer.

One thing we do know is that the white collar worker has increased in numbers. His rise in the occupational scene has accompanied the steady growth of the bureaucracy, that highly efficient structure for the handling of big business, big government, big labor, big educational, religious, and welfare organizations.

The white collar woman worker is a relatively new addition to the labor force, and she may increase in numbers if automation proves that a woman with a push button at her fingertips is equal to, or perhaps better than, a male button-pusher. The way the Census is set up, it is difficult to get an accurate count of white collar workers, but we may safely estimate that over half of the people in the labor forces are not engaged in the direct production of goods, and of this group, about 55% are women.

The group of white collar women workers is not a group that can be defined by function. They divide roughly into two types, the sub-professional clerical workers of which there are great numbers, and those who have risen to the higher levels of management and professional life, the "women in the gray flannel suits," as Sloan Wilson calls them.

But they are all women, and as with all minority groups, quite a lot of stereotyping goes on. When the men say "all women are alike" they are referring to women as a group, without regard to the social and cultural situations which might operate to make them not alike.

I am not going to fight the weary, worn-out battle of the sexes, nor am I going to enter into a discussion on physical or psychological differences or differences in intelligence between the sexes. It may be true that some women do demonstrate such differences, but all men are not paragons of health and emotional adjustment, either, nor are they all mental giants. People demonstrate such differences, but it is simply not true that these differences set women apart from the rest of mankind—that they constitute a separate species.

But there are reasons to believe that women do constitute a special problem, and it shall be my theme to describe what lies at the root of this problem. I shall try to show that it is the social situ-

* Delivered at Eastern Area Education Conference, Office Employees International Union, AFL, Rutgers University, January, 1956. Miss Hurd is Dean of Students and Chairman of the Department of Sociology, Rutgers University.

ation along with the physical or psychological that must be looked at, if we are to understand the problems of women. By that, I mean that the social environment impinges upon women in a different way. Women are not involved in the social environment in the same way men are. By the time women come into the working force, they have been conditioned, or have learned by experience that the social scene does differ for them, and by then, they have developed defensive or meliorative behaviors that show up in the working situation as "problems."

Not only does being a woman pose a special set of problems, but the white collar environment presents problems that are different from the blue collar environment. American women have had a two-generation experience in factories and service institutions, but the white collar woman worker came in with machinery and bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy is the natural habitat of the white collar worker. Instead of doing business on a case-to-case basis, in a network of personalized relations, the bureaucracy is governed by rules and regulations and is set up as a series of fixed jurisdictional areas with the official activities of each rank supervised by the next higher rank. Written documents, money, procedures and people are handled in such a way as to insure the continuity of the enterprise, and to depersonalize the activities. The assignment of jobs occurs on the basis of technical qualifications; authority to give commands is fixed in a stable way and there are pre-determined levels of graded authority. . . .

C. Wright Mills points out that

all white collar workers have one distinguishing characteristic; namely, white collar people deal with symbols and with other people. They are the people who keep track, who do the recording, coordinating, and distributing, who handle the paper, the money, and the people. They sell not only their skills, but also their time, energy, and personality. They work for someone else on someone else's property. They are dependent on rules, systems, and procedures, and the power they exercise is a derived power.

The white collar workers do not have the financial edge they once had over the blue collar worker, nor can they claim the prestige they once accorded. The Department of Labor says that the average weekly pay of a factory worker is now \$79.72, whereas the National Office Management Association puts the average weekly pay of an office clerical worker at about \$60.00. The snobbery implied in the term "white collar" and "blue collar" is a thing of the past; in fact the terms themselves are meaningless. The gap in terms of education is narrowing also; about anyone who wants to can, with a high school education, get a simple office job, but the manual worker today is probably going to college in the evenings. Many white collar people are getting college educations also. But for many, this is a belated experience.

The white collar worker is not in the superior social position he once was; neither is his position in the office hierarchy stable. His position is equivocal. He may be one of the managed, on view from above, or he may be one of the managers, on view from below.

Occupying a middle position, with a derived status, and dependent on others for sources of authority and power, the white collar worker is indeed caught in a web of circumstances that contribute to his "loneliness."

The white collar field has a wide range of occupations. Historically, white collar workers have been more protected than wage earners from unemployment. They are in a fluid position in the office hierarchy, and it is difficult to define them functionally, as a group. Perhaps these may be some of the factors in explanation of why the white collar worker is not only politically impotent, but is not easily induced into labor organizations. It is estimated that white collar employees are only approximately 17% organized, while by contrast, manual workers are about 52% organized.

In addition to the problems of white collarism in general, the woman worker has a set of additional problems which accompany her as she enters the business world. These problems have to do with social arrangements, not physical or mental deficiencies.

Take for example, the fact that a woman's life falls into discontinuous sections. A boy knows from the beginning that he is to work, and if he desires, marry and become the head of a family. A girl does not know whether she will work, whether someone will ask her to marry, or whether she will both marry and work, either at the same time or at different times in her life. This is one of the problems in the education of women today. We have to try to educate them for a dual role — to prepare them for whatever comes.

This discontinuity of the life pattern is a basic social difference between men and women in our culture. It explains in large measure the work stability of men as against the tentative status of the young woman employee. It accounts for her temerity as against the aggressiveness of the male job seeker. What might appear as indifference or laziness as she seeks "just any job" could be explained by the fact that her past life has not been directed toward a job, and her future plans are not clear in that direction.

It is not easy for women to identify with a business or professional future. A man's future depends in part on how others identify him with his chosen work, and all through life he is pushed in the direction of assuming the identity that goes with it. Men have sponsorship which assists in the development of attitudes and loyalties. This sponsorship may be diffuse in that it comes from society in general, or it may be the specific sponsorship of teachers, colleagues, or peers.

A woman's training for the business world has been perhaps a high school and business school education, or a liberal arts education in some woman's college which is still sponsoring women as preservers and transmitters of culture. Her educational opportunities have been prescribed, her affiliations are limited. She belongs to no professional society, no service club. She does not go to Rotary or Kiwanis to enjoy the easy camaraderie and gossip of the local business world.

While the bureaucracy sets up objective criteria for advancement, and theoretically, any person — whether man or woman — who is

able to meet these criteria is eligible for advancement, research shows that personnel rise from the lower strata by conforming to the social characteristics of the upper strata, such as participation in out-of-office activities, membership in accepted secret societies and clubs, and even religious and political affiliations. In spite of training, seniority and good performance, informal factors and personal sentiments do enter in. But on whom can the woman model her behavior?

The woman entering the business world comes in unsponsored. She may have many recommendations, but she does not have the sponsorship of contemporaries, either contemporary individuals or contemporary society, to facilitate her identification with the job or to assist her in internalizing her motivation. Stories of the career women in fabulous jobs somewhere in New York or California are poor substitutes. She is free-floating, so to speak, unattached to the core of male attitudes and interest which constitute the center of the working motivation for men.

A major characteristic of white collarism is that it involves more direct personal contact in a social interactional sense. That is, more personal interaction is required among white collar workers than among workers on a factory assembly line.

But here again, the woman moves right into a situation that mirrors our society's belief that intimate work groups should be composed of either sex, but never both. She also discovers that society and the office believe that it is wrong for a man to be subordinate to a woman, except in

the most affectional relationships.

She will very likely have as her supervisor an older man, especially if she is very young. This, I believe, is supposed to be a form of fatherly protection. While a plant supervisor of a group of factory girls may be only two or three years older, an office boss is usually six or seven years older than his female employees. In the white collar pyramids, authority is roughly graded not only by sex but by age. In moving up, she has to jump both the age and the sex barrier. If men white collar workers worry about the "younger man—older man" conflict, another dimension of the problem is added for the woman employee.

When a woman enters the competitive relationship that exists in business, she enters also the added and unnecessary competition of having to prove herself as a woman. And to put a father surrogate above her is really a mean trick. For it complicates the competitive process.

One of the serious problems of the woman worker is this matter of competition. Interaction in a business sense is usually one of conflict; that is, ideas are put forth, plans are discussed, procedures debated and the best man wins. But boys have been taught from childhood not to fight with girls, and girls are taught that it is not lady-like to fight with anyone. If a white collar woman advances so far in the hierarchy as to sit at the planning table or in policy meetings, she finds that she is handicapped in the competitive process.

If she is aggressive, she arouses the latent antagonism of her fellows; if she is weak, she is just a

woman. In our puritanic mores, aggression by males toward females, and aggression by females toward males mean something entirely different from socially-sponsored aggression normally associated with economic competition. The type of interaction which usually takes place in male-female economic competition is one of good-natured "kidding," to avoid guilt on either side. It thus develops that while men find their gratification and job satisfactions in the pleasant and often barbed "kidding" by which they beat each other down, women are excluded from this intimate form of competitive murder.

She has to look for her success as a competitor in personal relationships. Since she moves on the periphery of the inner core of the group, she finds other satisfactions in having personal friends in the group who behave quite differently toward her when removed from the competitive situation.

This problem of competition is one reason why so many women hold jobs which do not involve the subordination of men. Teaching, library work and social work are considered "female occupations," not because women are better suited to these jobs, but because as yet they do not involve close competitive interaction with men workers in a primary group relationship. It will be interesting to see what happens when the old standard finally breaks down, as it is now doing, and men enter the typically "female occupations."

The present standard is that men accept women superiors with reluctance. The question arises only in white collar work, since the idea of putting a woman foreman over a crew of male factory

workers is, as Theodore Capelow says, "intrinsically ridiculous."

This, rather than any disability of women, explains why the number of women exceeds the number of men both absolutely and proportionately in the lower ranking clerical jobs. It explains why the proportion of women students in the major professional fields is slightly less than it was in 1910. The fact is that women's entrance into the professions and the upper reaches of industrial management has been effectively curtailed from the early promising hopes of the feminists. While the principle of equal pay for equal work is embodied in the wage scales, the reality of occupational equality becomes, as Capelow says, "a change in the forms of inequality."

The great number of white collar women workers is not in the professional group, but in the clerical. They are the women who are subordinate to the fatherly boss — the clerks, the stenographers, the secretaries. A man's name is on the door, and a man's hat is on the hatrack, but she becomes the office. A large part of the filing, recording, the paper handling, and the people-handling will be hers to do, and her status is subordinate to someone whose status is subordinate to someone else. She has responsibility and little authority as a white collar worker, and less as a woman.

The status problem becomes acute for her. The bureaucracy is a hot-bed of status striving. Money isn't everything. I have seen men resign good jobs because their private secretary was taken away from them in the creation of a centralized stenographic pool. The woman employee is in a sense a status symbol, especially the

secretary. Like the nameplate, the private cubicle with a window, the silver carafe, and the mahogany desk, the secretary is a status symbol. Her status is her boss' status. She falls into the hierarchy of ranks at her level that he is at his. She eats lunch and plays bridge with the other girls whose bosses are at the same level as hers. She doesn't go below or above it. Cliques and informal groups among women employees are likely to follow the status lines of their supervisors.

The claims to status and the trappings of status, with all their symbols and rituals are important to the white-collar worker. When status is weak, status distinctions become important, and many a white collar employee, deprived of status on the job, splurges on weekends or on vacations in an orgy of spending at plush hotels to gratify the need for status unsatisfied in the hierarchy of the office. The office Christmas party is another device which prases for a few blurred hours the ranks of higher and lower.

Our white collar woman worker spends a lot of money on clothes and personal appearance. One might think she dresses for her boss, but in truth, she knows that personal appearance has a lot to do with her claims to status and prestige. As Mills says, the status of the white collar worker can often be understood as the psychology of status-striving.

If the woman employee does not have status satisfactions in one job, why not try another? If mobility up the ladder is difficult, horizontal mobility, or changing from job to job on the same level, is easy. In fact, it is becoming a critical problem as women em-

ployees move around from job to job. If she doesn't like her boss, the simple fact is that she has nothing to lose, the grass may be greener on the other side of the fence, and her clothes will all be new on a new job. But this is not because she is "by nature" changeable and flighty. It is because she does not have the protections, guards, status-fixing devices, sponsorships, expectations and identifications that go along with the male employee. As I said before, she is free-floating in the business world.

But she does have strong ties apart from the business world, ties to place and location which she does not break too easily. Non-occupational considerations are important such as friends and activities, as are family ties and responsibilities. Women tend to be residentially immobile. Young unmarried girls may be induced to change residence, if the inducements are strong enough, but most women, especially older women and those in the higher occupational levels do not move easily. This puts them at a disadvantage in positions with corporations and governmental agencies which like to move employees about in different parts of the organization.

Space does not permit the development of this theme any further. I am trying to illustrate what is meant by the "impact of the social situation." I do not want to give the impression that it is men who do these things to a woman. Let me say immediately that women themselves are of little help to other women. Behind every successful woman is another woman doubting her success, not to mention a whole host of other women who think, with

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their men folks, that woman's place is in the home.

The white collar woman is caught in this impasse: if she plays the game according to men's rules, she runs into antagonisms of a male-oriented culture; if she plays it according to women's rules, she is accused by other women of using her feminine wiles. The truth is that economic life no longer runs on rules related to sex; rather on rules related to the efficient operation of business.

As long as the woman was in the factory of domestic service, her problems were either educational or physical, and protective legislation or educational activities were employed to solve them.

But more is required now. Any group interested in the white collar woman worker, whether union or management, has to do more than organize them into associations for purposes of educating them or protecting them.

The loneliness of the white collar worker, and his separation from meaningful ties in the white collar job is a critical problem which is not to be solved by organizing his loneliness. On the other hand, any group, whether management or labor, which tries to solve some of the concrete problems of individuals with regard to their relations in the social structure that is the modern bureaucracy, is coming closer to the problem. I will try to give some illustrations. It is hard to enlist the interest of younger women in any long-term project, whether it be an educational program for their own professional advancement, or labor union membership, or even membership in such white collar women's organizations as the National Secretary's Association

or the Business and Professional Women's Club, because the girls feel that they won't be working very long since they expect to get married.

Of course, they expect to get married. As a matter of fact, our present cultural pattern pressures women into marriage whether they want to or not. In the old days, if you didn't get married, you were merely a spinster. Today, people think there is probably something psychologically wrong with you if you do not marry. The spinsters of 100 years ago did not have to contend with Freud.

It would be interesting to know how many groups — labor, management, or voluntary associations — continue membership to the "alumna of the business world" who gets married? Is there any avenue for her to continue her business interest, on an inactive status? The only thing that ties her to her next job, which she will probably take after her children are grown, is her social security card.

How about these women who say that they are not interested in the job, but are working only to make a little extra money? They are, like the girls who hope to get married, temporary workers, but who constitute a reserve working force. They come into operation at both extremes of the business cycle. Low wages and unemployment will drive them into the labor market to supplement family incomes; high wages and a high level of consumer wants will attract them in prosperity. But the point is, as temporary as they may be on a short-range scale, they constitute a long-range reserve, and as such should be considered as qualified workers temporarily

on "leave." They should have some status along with this. We presently consider them only troublesome floaters in the labor market.

We go "all out" for our permanent members of the economic system, with special educational programs, plans for their economic security, and devices such as unemployment compensation to get them right back in the labor market, but I wonder if we truly appreciate the vast reserve potential that can be mobilized in a hurry, (as we demonstrated in war-time,) but whose members move in and out of the economic structure? The married woman worker and the pin-money workers are valuable, and should not be treated as "scabs."

Older white collar women workers are hard to interest in "careers." The reason for this, I believe, although I have no research evidence on which to base this opinion, is that they are afraid. As I pointed out earlier, their status situation is precarious, they have decided by now to hew to a very safe and narrow line by not moving or changing jobs, and they have arrived at a working balance in the power relation situation in the organization of which they have been a part. They are not going to do anything to disturb this. Being older, their situation becomes more precarious as each day brings them closer to retirement, so they are not going to do anything to upset the apple-cart. Here, I think, some basic changes should be made in the retirement system. If retirement benefits adhered to the worker, like social security, instead of to the job, some of the fear of losing the job, of moving to another job

would disappear. I believe that our working men and women should be protected by a more realistic retirement program. When a woman reads, as I did the other night in a newspaper column, that a study made by the 20th Century Fund showed that 75% of our citizens over 65 either have no income, or incomes of less than \$1,000 a year, she will protect her retirement in every way she can. She certainly will not, at this late date, jeopardize what she has.

The problem of the professional worker in the office structure is a difficult one. In theory, the professional was a person whose activities were governed by a code of ethics, and who put the common good above exclusive self-interest. But professionalism today has a connotation of specialization, and anyone who is specially trained considers himself a professional. Originally, professionals turned to their professional societies for the protection of their interests, but professional societies are more interested in the problems of the independent professional. The professional in the bureaucracy finds himself in a dilemma. With administration and management the status-bearing and money-producing jobs, a mere engineer or a mere professor or a corporation lawyer becomes part of the hired help. Professionals find themselves needing the services of a labor union, but they are not sure whether unionism is compatible with professional status.

The problems of the white collar worker are principally social. A status, recognition, and membership are what white collar employee is as equally anxious to belong as is the male employee.